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WHY PENALTIES BECOME HARSHER:
THE ROMAN CASE, LATE REPUBLIC
TO FOURTH CENTURY EMPIRE
Social or legal thinkers who have sought to explain historical changes in
patterns of punishment have commonly illustrated their theories with reference
to Rome. The case of Rome, where, according to the accepted view, a lenient
penal system in the late Republic gave way to a progressively harsher system
under the Empire, has been cited in particular as evidence that political causes
underlie fluctuations in penalties. It has been suggested that the upward trend
in penalties in Rome can be explained in terms of the substitution of monarchy
for aristocracy, and the increasingly absolutist tendencies of the monarchy. In
the following pages, this and other theories of penal change are considered, in
the light of developments in Rome over a period of about five hundred years,
roughly from the middle of the second century B.c. to the close of the fourth
century A.D.
The theory that changes in penal law are closely related to political develop-
ments was first put forward by Montesquieu.1 He regarded the view as vindi-
cated by the example of Rome: ". . . I believe that punishments are connected
with the nature of governments when I see this great people changing their civil
laws in this respect [that is, in respect of punishments] in accordance with altera-
tions in their form of government."' 2 Montesquieu found that penalties were
harsh in Rome when the government was tyrannical in nature; for example,
under the early kings, at the time when the Twelve Tables were in operation in
the early Republic, and in certain periods under the Empire when individual
Emperors reigned more -like military despots than constitutional monarchs.
Under monarchies, the risk of arbitrariness was reduced and concessions were
made to rank. Thus, he argued, the rule of the more moderate Emperors was
marked by differential treatment of higher and lower orders - the former were
punished leniently, the latter severely. Only under the Republic (after the penal
sanctions of the Twelve Tables had been set aside) were arbitrariness and in-
equality absent and leniency practiced towards all citizens in the administration
of the law.3
Montesquieu did not discuss in detail the reasons for the characteristic harsh-
ness of the penal codes of despotic regimes, stating only that severe penalties
were inevitable when despots ruled by inspiring terror in their subjects. Black-
1 MONTESQUIEU, DE L'ESPRIT DES LOtS bk. VI passim (1748). At any rate, Montesquieu
claimed originality, in a gloss to the beginning of ch. 15: "J'ay du plaisir quand je trouve
l'occasion de faire voir le rapport que les loix civiles ont avec les loix politiques, chose que
je ne snache pas que personne ait fait avant moy."
2 "Je me trouve fort dans mes maximes, lorsque j'ai pour moi les Romains; et je croix
que les peines tiennent A la nature du gouvernement, lorsque je vois ce grand peuple
changer A cet igard de loix civiles, IN mesure qu'il changeoit de loix politiques." Id. at
VI, 15.
s The above section is a summary of chaps. 9 ("De la s~vrit des peines dans les divers
gouvernemens") and 15 ("Des lois des Romains A l'6gard des peines").
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stone gave a more precise explanation of the same phenomenon when he wrote,
in the Commentaries:
We may further observe that sanguinary laws are a bad symptom of the
distemper of any state, or at least of its weak constitution. The laws of the
Roman kings, and the twelve tables of the decemviri, were full of cruel pun-
ishments: the Porcian law, which exempted all citizens from sentence of
death, silently abrogated them all. In this period the republic flourished:
under the emperors severe punishments were revived; and then the empire
fell.4
Blackstone seems to be asserting that the severity of the penal code of a state is
an index of the weakness or insecurity of the government of that state. His
choice of examples (the kings, the decemvirs, the emperors) suggests that he
thought absolute governments were necessarily or at least typically "of weak
constitution." 5
The political explanation of penal change recurs in Durkheim's Deux lois
de l'lvolution pinale, as part of a general theory of historical changes in
penology. His "Law of Quantitative Variation" states that the penal systems
of societies become milder, on the one hand as societies become more "ad-
vanced" in structure and organization, and on the other hand as their govern-
ments move away from absolutism. 6
Durkheim, in his analysis of the political factor, emphasizes that a penal
system will reflect the quality of the relationship between ruler and ruled. The
relationship between an absolute sovereign and his subjects is not reciprocal but
unilateral. As a Roman father by the civil law "possessed" his son, almost as
he might possess a piece of property, so the absolute sovereign, according to
Durkheim, has complete control over his subjects; he is not obliged to keep one
side of a contract, nor is he bound by any regulation to protect the rights of the
individual. Moreover, the absolute ruler is so far raised above the common run
of men that he is likely to acquire a semidivine status. Since the ruler is the
source of all law, not only crimes which threaten his life and dignity, but
all or most infringements of the law are likely to be punished harshly, as akin
to sacrilege.7
Durkheim was aware that the two factors (one sociological, the other politi-
cal), which in his mind determined the quality of a society's penal code, are
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES 17 (3rd ed., 1768-9). See J. HEATH,
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PENAL THEORY 190 (Oxford, 1963).
5 This idea is not totally absent from DEL L'ESPRIT DES LOIS (see, e.g., V, 14), but is
given little emphasis there.
6 DURKHE M, 4 L'ANNEE SOCIOLOGIQUE 65-95 (1899-1900), discussed, to my knowledge,
only by E. A. Tiryakian, Durkheim's "Two Laws of Penal Evolution," 3 JOURNAL FOR THE
SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF RELIGION 261-6 (1963-4). The Law runs: "L'intensit6 de la peine
est d'autant plus grande que les socits appartiennent A un type moins .lev6 - et que le
pouvoir central a un caract~re plus absolu."
7 DURKHEIM, Op. cit. supra note 6 at 66-8, 93-4. On the father-child relationship, Durk-
heim might have quoted CICERO, PRO PLANCIO 12. 29: "parente . . . quem ueretur ut
deum, neque enim multo secus est parens liberis."
PETER GARNSEY
quite independent. 8 Absolute power may be associated with single or complex
kinds of society (societies which are less "advanced" or more "advanced"),
and, in a single state, a drift towards or away from absolute rule is not neces-
sarily accompanied by organizational or structural changes of a social kind.
He saw Rome as a case in point. The basic cause of the relative harshness of
Imperial penal law as compared with Republican penal law was, in his eyes,
the tendency towards absolutism of the government under the Empire.9 It is
curious that, although the factor of central importance for Durkheim was the
degree of complexity of a society, most of the material he assembled in the
course of his sweeping survey of history from ancient Egypt to nineteenth-
century Europe relates only to the political explanation. He does not seem to
have recognized that this casts doubt on the relevance of the social factor, the
degree of advancement of a society, as a determinant.
The political explanation for penal changes, as outlined by the theorists so
far considered, is too general to be very informative, but it at least provides a
starting point for a more detailed discussion of the issues involved. Its usefulness
will depend on the extent to which it can be related to specific developments in
the Roman penal system, which I now propose to analyze.
The accepted view is that the penal system of the middle and late Republic
was relatively mild. The system as we know it was milder in practice than it was
in theory. In theory, death was the penalty for a number of crimes, among
them, apparently, treason, incest, homicide (including parricide and murder by
poison, which in Rome was commonly connected with sorcery), judicial corrup-
tion, the forgery of documents or coins, and public violence. However, officials
having responsibility for law enforcement did not as a rule see to it that the
death sentence was executed. A defendant on a capital charge was allowed the
opportunity of leaving Rome and Italy before he was actually found guilty by the
court. This "self-imposed" banishment became permanent when a bill of out-
lawry, or "interdiction from fire and water," was passed, stating in effect that any
"exile" who returned to Roman soil might be put to death with impunity by
anyone. The system appears to have been modified in two respects in the closing
decades of the Republic. First, outlawry was apparently transformed from an
administrative sanction, in the form of a bill-passed perhaps once each year and
applying retrospectively to all voluntary exiles of the year, into a formal penalty
applying by law to a particular defendant found guilty of a capital offense.
Whether the death penalty was suspended about the same time, as some scholars
have believed, must remain doubtful.10 That it was rarely applied throughout
8 DURKHEIM at 69. The sociological factor is treated at length in Durkheim's earlier
works, DE LA DIVISION DU TRAVAIL SOCIAL (1893), and LES RG OLES DE LA M-THODE
SOCIOLOGIQUE (1895).
9 "Mais quand, avec l'empire, le pouvoir gouvernemental tendit A devenir absolu, la loi
p~nale s'aggrava." Id. at 74.
10 See, e.g., E. Lzvy, DIE ROMISCHE KAPITALSTRAFE 14 (Heidelberg, 1931). The best
book on Roman criminal law is still TH. MOMMSEN, RoMISCHES STRAFPRCHT (Leipzig,
1899).
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the period, however, is not disputed. Secondly, Julius Caesar attempted to ensure
that those convicted of capital crimes did not get off with all their financial
assets as well as their lives. According to Suetonius, Caesar enacted that parri-
cides should suffer total confiscation, and other capital offenders should retain
half of their property."1
So far it is possible to proceed with a measure of confidence, although the
answers to some questions are uncertain. But more difficult problems are encoun-
tered when it is asked to what extent the system as described above was -applied.
All the evidence for the evasion of the death penalty through voluntary exile is
related to defendants from the senatorial order. We have no information regard-
ing the treatment of rank-and-file citizens as defendants. It may be that the mag-
istrates, drawn from the senatorial order, were less inclined to permit low-status
defendants to remain out of custody before trial, than they were to grant this to
high-status defendants. 12 A remark of a leading senator in a senatorial debate of
63 B.C. suggests that the ruling class in Rome did not have the .concept of a
uniform penal code for all Romans. When Silanus the consul-designate opposed
the use of the death penalty against senators allegedly implicated in the Catilinian
conspiracy, he argued that the highest penalty for a senator was imprisonment.' 3
By implication, he did not exclude execution as a penalty for ordinary citizens.
As for aliens of free birth, some communities within the Empire were able, to
the best of our knowledge, to dispense criminal justice over their own citizens even
in the late Republic. Again, little information is available about the way in which
aliens were dealt with by Roman judges and juries, both where local tribunals
had given up jurisdiction over crimes to proconsuls, and in Rome, where aliens
seem to have had access to Roman courts. Of course aliens, as technically out-
side the civil law, were allowed no legal means of defense against magisterial
arbitrariness-they could not appeal against summary beating, imprisonment, or
execution. But to say this is not to convey any information about the quality of
the justice which aliens regularly received from Roman judges, or about the
kinds of penalties they suffered when the judgment went against them. To my
mind it is a safe conjecture, that, just as the Romans in their political relations
with their subject peoples did not regard them as one homogeneous class, but
favored the local aristocracy (confirming them in power in their cities, granting
them citizenship and access to the higher orders in Rome), so in their adminis-
tration of the law they gave more generous treatment to the wealthy and influ-
ential than to the mass of provincials.1 4
To summarize: the penal system of the Roman Republic was milder for
citizens than for noncitizens, and in all probability for higher orders than for
SUETONIUS, DivUS IULIUS 42.
12 It should of course be borne in mind that some crimes, e.g., judicial corruption and
extortion, were only abnormally committed by men of low rank.
13 PLUTARCH, CICERO 21, 3.
14 See n. 48 below, for judicial hearings for noncitizen defendants. For local criminal
jurisdiction and the intrusion of the governor, see MOMMSEN, op. cit. supra note 10 at 222-
50; Peter Garnsey, The Criminal jurisdiction of Governors, 58 JOURNAL OF ROMAN
STUDIES (1968). On appeal, see A. H. M. JONES, STUDIES IN ROMAN GOVERNMENT AND
LAW 53f. (Oxford, 1960); Garnsey, The Lex Iulia and Appeal Under the Empire, 56
JOURNAL OP ROMAN STUDIEs 167 (1966).
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lower orders within both the citizen population and the noncitizen population
of the Empire. Under the Empire, outlawry, or interdiction, was made the basis
of a formalized penalty of exile. Exile was no longer a self-imposed sanction
by which the legal penalty (death) was eluded, but a regular sentence, enforced
by the state.1 5 Defendants on capital charges were not normally able to choose
whether to flee or to wait for a verdict. Before their trial they were, where
possible, arrested or kept under surveillance. If found guilty, they were escorted
out of the country, often to a specific place of banishment. Imperial rulings
fixed the consequences of exile: they consisted of loss of status (including citizen-
ship) and partial confiscation of property.16
The death penalty, meanwhile, was not suddenly reintroduced. As before, it
was there to be invoked in exceptional circumstances, and especially for the
punishment of high treason. In the senatorial debate already referred to, Cicero
and Cato persuaded the majority of the Senate, against the advice of Caesar
and Silanus, that Lentulus and his alleged co-plotters had forfeited their rights
as citizens by conspiring to overthrow the constitution, and merited immediate
execution. Where the Empire diverged from the Republic was in the interpreta-
tion of what constituted high treason.
The crime of treason was not amenable to precise definition. Cicero described
treason, or "the diminution of maiestas," as "the diminution of the dignity,
grandeur and power of the people or of those to whom the people have entrusted
power."' 7 Under the Republic the treason law was comparatively narrow in
scope. It covered armed rebellion, sedition, and certain offenses of magistrates
or promagistrates, such as unauthorized departure from a province or un-
authorized waging of a war.1 8 It would plainly be difficult to restrict the
number of offenses included in the law once the focus of the law had changed
and its chief purpose had come to be seen as the protection of the maiestas of
the Emperor. There was no theoretical limit to the number of ways in which
the Emperor's majesty might be thought to be compromised or slighted. Some
extensions of the treason law were accomplished relatively early, and were pre-
dictable - for example, slander of the Emperor and the Imperial family, and
adultery with a princess. The first of these was in fact resisted by Augustus and
by Tiberius, who also stood in the way of the efforts of ambitious accusers and
"loyalist" senators to expand the law to encompass numerous petty offenses.
But what one Emperor considered trivial a later Emperor might think serious.
Tiberius had refused to regard as treason trifling acts of disrespect against a
consecrated Emperor (Augustus).19 However, in the second and the early third
century, when greater emphasis was placed on Emperor worship, acts of a
15 On voluntary exile, see CICERO, PRO CAECINA 100; cf., on exile as a penalty, DIOEST
37.14.10 (Labeo, Augustan jurist, cited).
1 For enactments of Augustus and Tiberius on the content of exile, see Dio 56.27.2-3;
57.22.5.
17 CICERO, DE INVENTIONE 2.53: "maiestatem minuere est de dignitate Rut amplitudine
aut potestate populi aut eorum quibus populus potestatem dedit, aliquid derogare."
Is For offenses of proconsuls, see, e.g., CICERO, IN PISONEM 50.
19 These acts included the introduction of an actor-prostitute among worshippers of
Augustus, the sale of a statue of Augustus with (other) garden property, and perjury by
Augustus' name. See TACITUs, ANNALES 1.73.
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similar kind were definitely punished as treason.2 0 Later Emperors further
extended the treason law, by subsuming under it offenses which were more
properly covered by other laws, for example, the forgery of coins and the
murder of a high official. 2 1
Two ways in which the Imperial treason law differed from the Republican
treason law 'have now been specified. A law which had been designed primarily
to protect the state was in practice employed to safeguard the position of the
Emperor, as the personification of the state; the law was open-ended and far
from static. A third difference concerned penalties. Executions for treason
were more common under the Empire.22 Execution was exacted for treason under
the Republic on those infrequent occasions when the safety of the state was
thought to be endangered by armed rebellion or sedition. Those executions,
moreover, were carried out in a military rather than a judicial context: they
followed the passing of a decree (senatusconsultum ultimum) which was a
declaration of martial law. Emperors faced not only the threat of armed rebel-
lion, but also that of assassination. Few Emperors, if any, were without enemies,
and some felt themselves surrounded by them. In the first century of the
Empire alone, a substantial number of senators and equestrians were put to
death or forced to take their own lives for allegedly plotting against the
Emperor. Further, the basic insecurity of the position of the Emperor was
reflected in the administration of the other sections of the treason law. The
Republican Senate declared war on and put to death those whose activities
were thought to be dangerous to the state, but allowed others convicted of
treason to go into exile. Under the Empire, the death penalty was expected in
virtually all cases covered by the treason law.
Treason, however, was a special case. The higher orders under the early
Empire ran little risk of execution as long as they did not plot against the
life of the Emperor or cause him offense. (Given the personalities of some of
the Emperors, this was not always easy.) Their position deteriorated little in
the second and early third centuries. There is explicit evidence for the appli-
cability of the death sentence in this period only for parricide and arson in its
most dangerous form (arson in a city for plunder).23 The claim of a Neronian
senator that exile was the highest penalty for a senator was otherwise true for
20 DIGzsT 48.4.5-6.
21 CODEx THEOrOSxANUS 9.21.9, A.D. 389, 392 (forgery); 9.14.3, AD. 397 (murder).
Add 16.1.4, A.D. 380 (heretics who provoke agitation). For the virtual identity of sacrilege
and treason, see n. 72, below.
22 It is unnecessary to document this in detail. The Republican senatusconsultum ultimum
was used against C. Gracchus (121 B.c.), Saturninus (100 B.C.), Catiline (63 B.c.) and
the false Marius (44 B.c.), to mention the best-known cases. For the Empire we must con-
sider both executions which followed military rebellions, and deaths arising out of treason
trials (for which there is no Republican equivalent). Even if the Republican proscriptions
of, e.g., Sulla are included, the numbers would still be unequal, as the testimony of Tacitus,
Cassius Dio, Suetonius, and other sources for the early Empire, should make clear.
23 DIGEsT 48.19.15 (parricide); COLLATIO 12.6.1; DIGEST 48.19.28.12 (arson). No cases
of execution for either crime are recorded by the sources for this period, which are scanty and
generally of mediocre quality. It is not known whether in the latter case the penalty was
stepped up. The penalty for parricide had increased if senators were allowed to escape
death under the Republic (see n. 11, above). Of course, the first reference is explicit
evidence only for the execution of municipal aristocrats for parricide.
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the period up to and including the Severan age (A.D. 193-235).24 The aristoc-
racy lost ground only in the late third and the fourth century, when magic, simple
homicide, adultery (and other sexual offenses), public violence, and some kinds
of forgery were added to the list of crimes punished with death.2 5
However, for the lower orders, that is to say, slaves, free aliens, freedmen
and citizens of low rank, death was a common penalty, and not only death by
decapitation (the least painful and degrading form of execution), but also
death by fire, exposure to wild beasts, crucifixion, and mortal combat. At least
some of these sanctions had been used under the Republic, but only against
slaves and deserters with any degree of regularity. 2 6 The novelty lay in their
application under the Empire to free men of low status whether citizens or
noncitizens. We should be careful not to exaggerate the rate at which the
situation of this group worsened (and the extent to which it worsened). Citizens
on occasion had died like slaves at the -hands of harsh governors in Republican
times. Moreover, such events may have been equally rare and equally dis-
approved of in the first century of the Empire. 27 By the Severan period, how-
ever, What had once been irregular was now the norm. This can be gauged,
first, from juristic generalizations. Callistratus, writing at about the turn of
the second century, remarked that cremation was mostly a slave penalty, but
that "plebeians" and "men of low rank" (humiles personae) too were burned
alive.28 His younger contemporary Macer made the remarkable statement
(reversing the expected sequence) that slaves were punished after the example
of men of low rank (humiliores).29 These comments are supported by evidence,
dating from Hadrianic times (A.D. 117-38), of the prescription of these penalties
in the punishment of arson, murder, parricide, the more serious cases of sacri-
lege, and so on.30 Finally the jurists warned against throwing to the wild beasts,
24 Dxo 62.15.1a (Thrasea Paetus, a victim, subsequently, of the law of treason under
Nero).
25 SENTENTIAE PAUL 5.23.17; cf. 16; CODEX THEODOSIANUS 9.16.1; 4; 8 (magic);
SENTENTIAE PAUL! 5.23.1 (homicide); CODEx THEODOSIANUS 9.38.1 (adultery); ibid.
9.10.1 (public violence); 9.21.5; 9.22; etc. (forgery). Constantine brought back the old,
harsh punishment for parricide. See ibid. 9.15.1. It is possible that public violence was not
punished with death after Constantine except in the case of particularly notorious offenders.
It was not one of the unpardonable offenses. See ibid. 9.38.3-4, 6-7, etc. The question
arises, to what extent were these constitutions applied? This must have depended upon the
initiative of the high Imperial officials and the attitude of the reigning Emperor (as well
as the discretion of the ordinary judge). Not all prefects of Rome were as zealous as the
acting-prefect Maximinus was in detecting, prosecuting and punishing senatorial crime, and
not all Emperors were as unsympathetic towards senators as Maximinus' Emperor, Valen-
tinian. A lengthy description of Maximinus' judicial activities is presented in AMMIANUS
28.1.5f. (It is obvious that neither Ammianus nor any other ancient writer was interested
in judicial affairs for their own sake, independent of their political import. No cause-list
can be reconstructed from the primary sources for any period.)
26 Crucifixion: Lrvy 1.26.6; CscERo, PIO CLUENTIO 66.189; PRo R4asmo 5.16; VALERIUS
MA.XMUS 8.4.2; Beasts: ibid. 2.7.13; Lrvy, PERIOCHAE 51.
2T Republic: CsCElo, AD FAMILIARES 10.32.3; 2 IN VERREM 5.162f. (Cicero, needless
to say, was bitterly critical of these actions.) Empire: SUETONIUS, GALBA 9; JOSEPHUS,
BELLUM JUDAiCUM 2.301f.
2 DMEST 48.19.28.11.
29 Ibid. 48.19.10 pr.
30 For condemnation to the beasts, see DioEST 48.9.9 pr. (parricide); 47.14.1.3
(rustling); 48.8.3.5 (murder); 48.13.6 (sacrilege). In the case of rustling, the text shows
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crucifying, or burning alive decurions (city councillors, the nucleus of the local
aristocracy), soldiers, veterans and their children. (A fortiori, the equestrian
and senatorial orders were held to be immune from punishments of this kind.)
This may be held to confirm indirectly that the penalties were in use.3 1 On
a deeper level, it may be taken as firm evidence for the dual nature of the
Roman penal system. Individual governors, and Emperors too, in their crueler
and more irresponsible moments, used servile or "plebeian" penalties against
decurions, equestrians and even senators. But these were isolated acts which
cla.hed with established custom. 3 2
A number of penalties were not "legal," in the sense that they were never
recognized or' prescribed by any statutfe, arid, more-specifically, by any of the
statutes which defined particular offenses and set up jury-courts for their pun-
ishment. The criminal law of the late Republic knew as penalties only death
(which was normally by decapitation), outlawry or interdiction, and the money
fine. Penalties such as crucifixion and cremation were applied in an admin-
that the introduction of the penalty was a post-Hadrianic development. Were these
penalties actually applied? Sometimes the text leaves no doubt of it. i) Ulpian knew
from personal experience ("scio") that many were condemned to the beasts for sacrilege
(ibid. 48.13.6). It must be stressed that the Antonine and Severan jurists commonly held
important posts in the Imperial administration, which carried judicial responsibilities. See
W. KUNKEL, HERXUNFT UND SOZIALE STELLUNG DER ROMISCHEN JURISTEN (Weimar,
1952). ii) In DIGEST 48.8.3.5, Marcianus states not that exposure to the beasts is the
official, or stated, penalty for members of low-status groups, but that it is the customary
penalty for them if convicted of homicide (or other offenses covered by the Cornelian law
de sicariis et venificiis). iii) Where a penalty is laid down in a rescript by an Emperor,
it is reasonable to assume (where the context shows that he has been consulted by an
official) that the consulting official would follow the Emperor's instructions. In the case
of parricide (ibid. 48.9.9 pr.), it was Hadrian who revised the penalty. The governor in
c. A.D. 177 in Lyons sent noncitizen Christians (and Attalus, a citizen) to the beasts after
consulting Marcus Aurelius, presumably on the matter of penalties, and receiving a reply.
See EusEsIus, HISTOaIA ECCLESIASTIGA 5.1.44, 47. Christians frequently suffered this
penalty. See F. CABROL, H. LECLERCQ, 1 DICTIONNAIRE D'ARCHEOLOGIE CHRETIENNE ET DE
LITURGIE 452 f., v. "ad bestias" (1924).
31 See DIGEST 28.3.6.10; 48.19.9.11; 49.16.3.10; 49.18.3. The contexts do not indicate
explicitly that any decurions, veterans, et al., actually suffered these penalties. Cf. n. 36,
below.
32 JOSEPHUs, BELLUM JUDAIcUM 2.301f.; PLINY, EPISTOLAE 2.11 (governors); SuEToNz-
us, GAIus 27.3-4 (Emperor). If the sources were more adequate, we would doubtless be
able to add to these references. It is nonetheless correct to regard these as "deviant" cases.
i) The proper penalty for decurions (and for those with equal honor, Cf. DIGEST 49.18.3)
in the case of ordinary capital offenses was exile. See, e.g., the rescript of Marcus and Verus
(AD. 161-7) in ibid. 48.22.6.2. Given the nature of the sources, it is not possible to prove
that this "official" policy was earned in a majority of cases (see n. 25 fin. for comments
on the orientation of the sources; there is even less concern with the administration of
justice in the provinces than in Rome). Further, DIGEsT 48.19.15 suggests that decurions
suffered nothing more serious than decapitation for "extraordinary" capital offenses
(treason, parricide, etc.). The phrase capite puniri is normally used for the simple death
penalty, death by decapitation, and summum supplicium for aggravated forms of the death
penalty. ii) As for equestrians and senators, the evidence for their treatment as defendants
is concentrated in the writings of the literary sources for the first century A.D. To balance
the three incidents recorded by Josephus, Pliny and Suetonius (above), which were re-
counted with disapproval by those authors, and explicitly referred to in one case (Josephus)
as novel, are numerous cases where exile was the sentence or death by decapitation or the
noose. iii) Finally, the evidence already cited (see text to nn. 28-31 and nn.) seems to
me to show that plebeians regularly suffered aggravated forms of the death penalty.
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istrative rather than a judicial setting: they were principally used against
members of social groups with no standing in Roman law. One development
of the early Empire was the emergence alongside the jury-courts of tribunals
which were empowered to try offenses by an inquisitorial procedure. (The jury-
courts operated according to an accusatorial procedure.) The judge who
administered the new procedure (cognitio) controlled the whole trial, including
the choice of penalty. As no laws or magisterial edicts governed his investiga-
tion, in selecting a penalty he was not restricted to the few which the law recog-
nized. There was no fixed number of penalties, and ingenious judges could
devise new ones. One penalty introduced in the early Principate was metallurn,
or condemnation to hard labor in the mines.
Metallum was the most severe secondary penalty in the penal code of the
Empire. It was a life sentence. The condemned was beaten, branded, and loaded
with chains. His legal position was tantamount to that of a slave. Labor on
public works and services, or opus publicum, was a milder penalty of the same
kind. In this case the condemned retained his freedom, and his sentence was
not necessarily for life. These two penalties established themselves in the course
of two centuries as the standard alternatives to deportation (or capital exile)
and relegation (or noncapital exile). They were intended for defendants of
low status alone. This was already indicated by judicial decisions of Hadrian
and Pius in the early second century, which allowed for variation of penalty
on the basis of status.3 3 Moreover, the Severan jurists showed themselves alive
to the danger of the indiscriminate use of the penalties of hard labor by identi-
fying specific status groups which were exempt from them.3 4 That the danger
was real is shown by Imperial rescripts, for example, the rescript of Severus
Alexander to one Demetrianus, confirming that his mother should not have
been (non oportuisse) sent to the mines if she was a decurion's daughter.35 The
differential-penalty system was naturally more difficult to enforce in practice,
especially in outlying areas of the Empire, than it was to set up in theory.
Among minor penalties beating may be singled out. Beating with a rod (or
with a whip in the case of a slave) was a form of coercion which magistrates
under the Republic were entitled to apply only to noncitizens. In Imperial
times, however, it was regularly employed against men of low rank (whether
citizens or not) as an alternative to the fine, or as a preliminary to the more
severe low-status punishments. In the case of beating also, exemptions apply-
ing to certain privileged groups, including, for example, decurions, are implicit
or explicit in legal texts of the Antonine and Severan periods.3 6 The exemp-
tions were, on the whole, maintained in the fourth century, in official policy
at least, although the attitude of some Emperors wavered. Meanwhile the
33 Dtoasr 47.21.2 (opus); 48.13.8.1 (metallum).
34 Ibid. 48.19.9.11; 49.18.3.
35 CoDEx JUSTINIANUS 9.47.9; cf. ibid. 5.
38 DIGEST 48.19.28.2, 5; CODEX JUSTIN!ANUS 2.11.5. The first text states that convicts
of low rank were customarily "(solent) beaten. The second is a rescript of Septimius Severus
(A.D. 193-211) to one Ambrosius, which by its wording leaves no doubt that he, a decurion,
had been improperly beaten. It is unlikely that this rescript was the only one of its kind.
See DIGEsT 48.19.28.2 fin. (... idque principalibus rescriptis specialiter exprimitur).
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sanction itself had become more severe, with the substitution of a whip tipped
with lead for the rod as the main instrument for beating.37
By the second and third centuries, then, a large proportion of the popula-
tion of the Empire (for the privileged groups were numerically a small minor-
ity) was subject to two new and degrading sanctions, metallum and opus, which
deprived the individual of liberty temporarily or permanently (and in the
former case reduced him to the state of a slave), and to bodily chastisement.
But we must still ask just how prevalent were these sanctions. To answer this
question it is necessary to introduce and explain the jurists' distinction between
"public" crimes and "private" (or "extraordinary") crimes. By "public" crimes,
the jurists understood those offenses which were defined by statutes and at first
investigated by the jury-courts and punished with the penalties established by
those statutes. As already stated, execution, interdiction and the fine were the
only :statutory penalties. The jurisdiction of the jury-courts was gradually
undermined by the new mode of criminal justice, cognitio, and the courts lapsed
into inactivity, at least by the Severan period.38 The statutes, however, had not
been revoked; and the crimes, and the courts which judged them, were still
thought to possess a special status. In Imperial times, the word "crimen" was
no longer restricted to offenses punished in "public" courts. In the course of
the first century A.D. new "crimes" began to make their appearance, many of
which had previously been treated as private delicts, to be avenged by the indi-
vidual (rather than punished by the state) by a private suit, the object of which
was the winning of compensation. By the Severan age there were no "private!'
offenses which could not be punished by the same procedure which had dis-
placed the criminal jury-courts, cognitio.39 Now the judge who investigated a
"public" crime by cognitio might be guided by the statute which defined the
crime and set a penalty, but he was by no means obliged to apply that penalty.
If the crime was acknowledged to be capital, the judge was expected to retain
"the penalty of the law," interdiction (or its successor, deportation), for
defendants of high status, and to sentence others to metallum or to some form
of the death penalty, depending on the gravity of the crime.4 0 Noncapital
crimes, for which a monetary penalty had been laid down by law, would be
punished by a fine, or a mild form of exile, or some minor disability (in the
case of defendants of high station), and by some kind of public labor or corporal
punishment (in the case of other defendants). As for the "private" crimes, no
3- Immunity of decurions: CoDEx THxODOSIANUS 9.35.2 pr., A.D. 376 (but see ibid. 2.1);
12.1.80, A.D. 380; cf. ibid. 85, A.D. 381 (but see 12.1.117, A.D. 387). (Other) references
to the leaden whip include: 11.7.3, A.D. 320; 7, A.D. 353; 8.4.14, A.D. 383; 2.14.1.2, A.D.
400; 16.5.40.7, A.D. 407; 53, A.D. 412.
38 Garnsey, Adultery Trials and the Survival of the Quaestiones in the Severan Age, 57
JOURNAL OF ROMAN STUDIES 56 (1967).
s9 E.g., DIGEsT 47.1.3.
40 Low-status defendants were on occasion sentenced to some form of exile. See, e.g.,
SUETONIUs, Divus AUGUSTUS 51.1; TAcrrus, ANNALES 4.63; 14.62.4; PLINY, EPISTOLAR
8.14.12; DIGEST 48.10.13.1; CoDEx THEODOSIANUS 9.17.1, A.D. 340; 8.5.17.1, A.D. 364;
15.12.3, A.D. 397; 9.30.5, A.D. 399; 9.36.2, A.D. 409; 16.5.65.3, A.D. 428. Relegatio, or non-
capital exile, was of course used as an extralegal sanction in Republican times by fathers
(against children), by patrons (against freedmen), and by masters (against slaves). See
MoMusEN, op. cit. supra note 10 at 18f.
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"legal" or statutory penalties existed for them, and the judge, if he was not
assisted by specific Imperial constitutions, was necessarily influenced by the way
in which "public" crimes were dealt with in his day. He would be aware that
common use was made of harsh or undignified punishments.
The rule that the use of torture, whether "third-degree" or inquisitorial, was
confined to slaves was by and large observed under the Republic. However,
an exception was made for enemies of the state both external and internal,
and this exception prepares us for the torture of suspected plotters and would-be
assassins in Imperial times. There is ample evidence in the literary sources that
when treason was uncovered or suspected, defendants and witnesses of any
rank were liable to examination by torture.4 1 The legal writings too bear
witness indirectly to the increased use of the sanction in the judicial system.
Certain categories of free men proved vulnerable to torture in the early second
century, if not before, and the Emperors were called upon to confirm the exemp-
tions of several groups on the fringes of the privileged class.4 2 But official policy
hardened in the fourth century, and whereas immunity from the "plebeian"
penalties was apparently retained by those Who had possessed it previously,
immunity from "servile" torture was definitely limited. High rank ceased to
provide protection from torture in cases of magic (or the related activities of
astrology, soothsaying, etc.) in addition to treason.43 Further, the least influential
and most exposed of the status groups, the provincial aristocracy or "curial
class," became, by a ruling of Constantine (A.D. 316), subject to torture in cases
of the forgery of documents, whether private or public.4 4 Later Emperors, more-
over, drew a distinction between the leading men in this group (the so-called
decemviri or principales) and the rest, and exempted only the former.45
It remains to consider imprisonment. Preventive detention before trial,
sentence, or punishment is amply documented both for the Republic and for
the Empire, and its use was uncontroversial. Imprisonment as a penalty,
however, never won official recognition. This suggests that the Romans did not
fully understand the direction in which their legal system was moving. In their
attempt to control the movements of low-status criminals, the judicial authori-
ties had devised a set of medium-range penalties which were in essence forms
of custody. At the same time, the most effective form of custody, long-term
incarceration, was regarded as an abuse. The Severan jurist Ulpian complained
of the "custom" of governors of sentencing condemned men to prison, and
wrote: "Prison is properly regarded as a way to retain men, not as a way to
41 See Dio 57.19.2; 58.21.3; 24.2; 27.2; SUETONIUS, TIBERIus 62 (Tiberius; only in the
first case is it specifically stated that treason was the charge); Dio 59.25.5b; cf. SENECA,
DE MA 3.18.3; Dso 59.26.4 (Gaius); Dio 60.15.5-6; 60.31.5; TAcITus, ANNALES 11.22
(Claudius-he had sworn not to torture any free man. Dio 60.15.6); TACITUS, ANNALES
15.56; 16.20 (Nero).
42 DiozST 50.2.14; CODEX JUSTINIANUS 9.41.11. In neither case is it clear from the
text that the constitutions were issued in response to complaints of individuals against the
employment of torture against them. This is, however, a reasonable assumption.
,3 CODEX THEODOSIANUS 9.35.1, A.D. 369; etc. (treason; also, forgery of an Imperial
signature, cf. 9.19.2, A.D. 326); 9.16.6, A.D. 358 (magic). For torture in treason trials see
AMMIANUS 19.12.17 (Cf. MOMMSEN, op. cit. supra note 10 at 407, n. 4).
44 CoDEx THEODOSIANUS 9.19.1, A.D. 316.
45 Ibid. 9.35.2.1, A.D. 376; cf. ibid. 6, A.D. 399.
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punish them." The Emperor Caracalla (A.D. 197-217) found the charge of one
Apion that a free man had been sentenced to life imprisonment (perpetua
vincula) incredible, as in his view the penalty was scarcely appropriate even for
slave criminals. But judges evidently took a less purist stance, and imprison-
ment became a regular alternative to penalties such as exile, the fine, and public
labor.46
To sum up: it is possible to distinguish under the Empire a trend towards
a more rigorous penal system. 4 7 In the first two centuries A.D., the simple
death penalty and cruel forms of execution became more common, the depriva-
tion of liberty combined with manual labor under harsh conditions was insti-
tuted as a secondary penalty, and other degrading punishments became normal
for the less serious offenses. Most of these penalties were in origin administra-
tive sanctions used mainly against slaves. Low-status citizens and high-status
citizens were probably treated differently already in Republican times. But the
downgrading of the position of the humble citizen virtually to that of the free
alien was a development of the first century A.D. (The poor citizen was favored
above the alien if both were defendants on the same charge. But the distinc-
tion between poor citizens and aliens was insignificant in comparison with that
between senators, for example, and men of low status, whether citizens or aliens.)
Meanwhile, the ,position of the most vulnerable of the privileged groups,
the gentry of the cities of the Empire, had become precarious. With severer
46 DIGEST 48.19.8.9 (Ulpian); CODEX JUSTINIANUS 9.47.6 (Caracalla); SENTENTIAE
PAULI 5.17.21; 5.18.1; 5.21.1-2. See also CODEX THODOSIANUS 9.3.2, A.D. 326 (Con-
stantine). One abuse that is well documented in the CODEX THEODOSIANUS is the holding
of suspects for extended periods in prison. Several Emperors threatened with punishment
judges (that is, provincial governors) who allowed this to happen by delaying trials, some-
times with the collusion of prosecutors. See CODEX THEODOSIANUS 9.3.1, A.D. 320 (Con-
stantine); 9.1.7, A.D. 338 (Constantius); cf. 9.3.6, A.D. 380 (Gratian, Valentinian, The-
odosius); 9.1.18, A.D. 396 (Arcadius and Honorius). Doubtless preventive detention was
misused from time to time throughout the period under survey. Reference is made in the
CODEX also to the holding in prison of men condemned to exile. See ibid. 9.40.22, A.D. 414.
Ibid. 23, A.D. 416 has a different tone, and may indicate that the practice had won a
measure of recognition. One matter which cannot be decided is whether conditions in
prisons worsened during our period. For the situation in the fourth century, see, e.g.,
LIBANIUS, ORATIONES 45; CODEX THEODOSIANUS 9.3.1, AD. 320; cf. ibid. 7, A.D. 409.
47 By no means all the evidence has been cited in the previous discussion. An upward
trend can be discerned if one examines the way in which particular offenses, e.g., kid-
napping, were punished over a period of time. i) Kidnappers were at one stage fined
(perhaps in the late Republic) but the Severan jurist Ulpian could speak of the offense as
'capital" (DIGEST 48.15.1). This probably indicates that loss of status rather than death
was involved, for the late-third century jurist Hermogenianus knew condemnation to the
mines as the commonest penalty (ibid. 7). Constantius (CODEX THEODOSIANUS 9.18.1,
A.D. 315) prescribed the penalty of condemnation to the beasts (or, as an alternative,
mortal combat, with the stipulation that there should be no chance of survival) for the
crime. ii) Peculation, normally a high-status crime (whereas kidnappers were perhaps
predominantly men of low status), was once punishable by a fine, but became a capital
offense, perhaps as a result of a constitution of Theodosius (CODEx THEODOSIANUS 9.28.1,
A.D. 392; but see 9.27.5, A.D. 383, and, for the offense when committed by decurions,
12.1.117, A.D. 387.) It is implied in the constitution that there were no intervening steps
between the imposition of the monetary penalty and of the capital penalty. The truth of
this cannot be tested. iii) Penalties for religious offenses increased in the course of the
fourth century, as the Christian Emperors became less tolerant of nonconformists and
pagans. For the details, see P. R. COLEMAN-NORTON, ROMAN STATE AND CHRISTIAN
CHURCH vols. I-II (London, 1966)..
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penalties readily available and in extensive use, the temptation of senatorial
judges, far from Rome, to employ them against all provincials without discrimi-
nation, must have been strong. The references in the legal sources to the exemp-
tion of the provincial elite from "plebeian" penalties begin in the early second
century and are scattered through the Antonine and Severan periods. They
testify to the desire of the central government to protect this group (there were
sound political and economic as well as social reasons for doing so) and to the
practical difficulties involved in achieving this.
The difficulties which faced the groups of higher status in Rome were
precisely the converse: they were uncomfortably close to the center of power.
Executions for political offenses were inevitable, especially in the first century
A.D., when the monarch and the aristocracy were feeling their way towards a
modus vivendi. But if treason and one or two other extraordinary offenses are
disregarded, exile was the worst a senatorial criminal was likely to suffer, until
the fourth century.
Some problems are raised by this analysis, and they should be dealt with
before the argument is taken any further. It might be thought that the mis-
fortunes of low-status defendants under the Imperial system have been exag-
gerated. There might appear to be a case for saying, for example, that the
criminal law was extended to a larger group of persons under the Empire, and
that as a result a greater proportion of the population had a better chance of
securing justice. Specifically, it is evident that free noncitizens became sub-
ject to trial by judges according to the cognitio procedure. This argument,
however, seems to proceed from the assumption that noncitizens under the
Republic were not covered by the criminal law, that is to say, were not given
judicial hearings, but were subject regularly to summary, extralegal coercion
by magistrates or pro-magistrates acting in an administrative capacity. The
Republican evidence, though scanty and uneven, is adequate enough to show
that this assumption is false.48 It is true that noncitizens under the Republic
possessed no guarantees against arbitrary treatment, whether in a judicial
context or not, but in this respect they were no worse off than noncitizens under
the Imperial system. Moreover, although the numbers of citizens increased sub.
stantially under the Empire, citizenship was worth less as it came to carry fewer
legal benefits.4 9
Again, doubts might be felt about the omission from the above account of
certain substantive improvements, which were achieved mainly under the
48 Aliens might be parties in the criminal courts in Rome. See MoMMSEN, op. cit. suptra
note 10 at 200. For direct or indirect evidence that noncitizens in the provinces were
given trials by governors, see, e.g., CICERO, 2 IN VEEREM 1.71f.; 2.68f.; 2.83f.; AD
QUINTUM FRATREM 1.2.5; esp. V. EHRENBERo and A.H.M. JONES, DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRAT-
ING THE REIGNS OF AUGUSTUS & TIBERIUS doc. 311 iv (Augustan in date, but relevant to
the earlier period) (Oxford, 1955). For a discussion of these and other texts, see Garnsey,
op. cit. supra note 14.
49 See A. N. SHERWIN-WHITE, THE ROMAN CrZENSHIP chs. 9-10 (Oxford, 1939).
Sherwin-White demonstrates that the content of citizenship had diminished substantially by
the second century A.D., and that this was true of both iura privata and iura publica. He
nevertheless overestimates the degree of protection possessed by the rank-and-file citizen
against the magistrate.
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Empire, in the legal position of groups having few or no rights in Republican
times. The reforms which might seem relevant to the present theme include
the disappearance of the penal powers of a husband over his wife, the placing
of legal restrictions on the power of discipline of a father over his child, and
the protecting of slaves against overharsh punishment by cruel masters. It has
been thought that these and other reforms came about largely as a result of the
humanizing influence of Stoicism and Christianity. 50
These improvements are to be seen as an aspect of the expansion of the
state's activities in the sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of private jurisdic-
tion, not as reforms of the penal law. For example, the Petronian law, which
laid down that a master should not give his slave to the beasts without first
obtaining the consent of a judge, maintained the use of this inhuman penalty
against slave criminals.5 1
Why was it that the Romans were able -to mitigate some of the rigors of their
legal system in the field of "household" law while allowing their penal law
to become more harsh? Here I can only suggest a possible approach to the
question. First, the improvements in the position of wives, children, and slaves
are not adequately explained in terms simply of the "humanizing influence" of
philosophical or religious movements. The political aspect of these develop-
ments, that is, the intrusion by the state into the sphere of private jurisdiction,
has already been mentioned. In addition, the developments which affected wives
and children might be regarded as delayed adjustments in the law to a changed
household structure and new inheritance patterns, which had been evolving
since the early days of the Roman city-state under the impact of economic
change, while the measures in favor of slaves probably had in view the safety
of the master as well as the welfare of the slave.5 2 There were no such factors
working for a reform of the penal system. The trend was in the other direction.
Secondly, it may be doubted whether Stoic and Christian thought was
marked by the kind of attitudes which might have reversed the trend, suppos-
ing, for the sake of the argument, that such reversal was possible. A study of
Stoic writings reveals no trace of protest at the employment of harsh penalties
50 See, e.g., F. ScHuLZ, PINCIPLES OF ROMAN LAW ch. 10, "Humanity," 189-222
(Oxford, 1936), for what is perhaps the standard view. Schulz acknowledges also the
influence of Greek thought
51 For the Lex Petronia (hardly later than Tiberius), see DIGEST 48.8.11; 18.1.42. It
should not be assumed that this and other legislation in favor of slaves was efficacious.
Note that Pius's legislation against saevitia contained nothing new: he was reinstating the
existing law, presumably because it had not been observed. See COLLATIO 3.3. (The restric-
tion of castration [SUETONIUS, DoMrrIANus 7; DIGEST 48.8.6 & 4] was not observed: there
was no shortage of eunuchs.) Not all Romans, and indeed not all Stoics, were as liberal
as Seneca was in the treatment of slaves. See SENECA, EPISTOLAE MORALES 47; DE
CLEMENTu 7, 18; DE BENEFICIIS 3, 18f. Contrast CIcERo, DE OFFicUS 2, 24 (Panaetius:
saevitia allowable).
5 Quot servi tot hostes was an old Roman proverb. It is interesting that, running
parallel to the legislation affording slaves a measure of protection against their masters,
are to be found enactments of conspicuous brutality, designed to deter slaves from murdering
their masters. For the senatusconsultum Silanianum, see DIGEST 29.5 passim; SENTENTIAE
PAULI 5.5; CODEX JUSTINIANUS 6,35. Cf. TACITUS, ANNALES 14.42f. with PLINY,
EPISTOLAE 8.14 and DIGEST 29.5.10.1. The Christian Emperor Justinian reaffirmed the
decree. See CODEX JUSTINIANUS 6.35.11-12.
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and tortures in the early Empire. Seneca, in de clementia, exhorted the young
Nero not to inflict the harsher penalties and in particular to avoid the death
penalty. This request, however, did not amount to a plea for a general scaling
down of penalties. In the first place, Seneca recommended that clementia be
given sparingly, only to those judged capable of redemption. 53 Again, Seneca
apparently had no quarrel with the level at which penalties were set in his day.
He defined clementia as the withholding of penalties which were deserved, and
this suggests that he did not believe that penalties were disproportionate to
crimes.5 4 Just as Seneca can perhaps be taken as a representative of enlightened
Stoic opinion, so it may be legitimate to regard Augustine and Ambrose as
spokesmen for liberal Christian thought in the fourth century. 55 Both men
favored moderation in punishment. Augustine, bishop of Hippo, urged Donatus,
proconsul of Africa, to punish "enemies of the Church" (presumably Donatists)
in accordance with the requirements of Christian mildness.5 6 Again, he praised
Marcellinus, Who presided over an Imperial inquiry into the Catholic-Donatist
controversy, for having conducted his investigation without having recourse to
the most cruel tortures.57 Ambrose, bishop of Milan, advised his correspondent
Studius, a Christian judge, to show clemency, citing as a model Jesus' treatment
of the adulteress.5 8 But neither Augustine nor Ambrose advocated a reduction
of penalties or the abolition of torture. Augustine stressed the importance of
obtaining confessions from suspects, and he commented that these could fre-
quently be extracted only by a severe inquisitio.59 While ruling out the more
53 DE CLEMENTIA 1.2.2. Cf. DE BENEFICTIS 1.4.2; 4.18: Beneficence was for the worthy
rather than the needy. (See also ibid. 1.10.3-4: the Stoics looked for a return. Ingratitude
was the greatest vice of all.)
54 Dz CLEMzNT 2.3.1-2. Moreover, from his description of pity as a defect of the
mind (vitium arimi), it may perhaps be inferred that Seneca did not feel, or did not allow
himself to feel, horror or repugnance at the violence of the harsher sinctions employed in
his day. See ibid. 2.4.4. In general, the Stoics were much more concerned with the state
of a man's mind and will than with the external conditions of his life. Epictetus thought
poverty and disease were not true evils. See 4.6.2; cf. 3.3.17f.; 17.8. For the primacy of the
spiritual life, see SENECA, EPISTOLAE MORALES 8.15. Further, the conservative outlook
and background of individual Stoic thinkers made them supporters of the status quo rather
than advocates of change. For Panaetius' views on property, see CICERO, DE OFFICIIs 1.29L;
cf. 51-2; 2.73f. He was a member of the governing nobility at Rhodes. His pupil
Posidonius favored the optimates. See F. JAconY, DIE FRAGMENTE DER GRIECHISCHEN HIs-
TORIKER n. 87 F, 110-11. For Seneca's political views, see EPisToLAE MORALES 73. If.; cf.
DE CLEMENTIA, passim; DE BENEPICis 2.20 (criticisms of Brutus and Cato).
5 Augustine (A.D. 354-430) of course spans the fourth and fifth centuries. (Ambrose died
in A.D. 397.) A full discussion of Christian views of punishment in the fourth century cannot
be undertaken here. It is clear that Christian attitudes were divergent. Some, including
bishops, favored the death penalty against heretics (AMBROSE, EpsToz.A 24.12; 26), while
others urged that judges who sentenced to death should be denied communion (e.g., ibid.
25.9). Ambrose took up a middle position (see below). On the attitudes and policies of the
Christian Emperors, see n. 63, below.
56 AUGUSTINE, EPIsOLmz 100.1 (A.D. 409); cf. 91.9 (A.D. 408).
51 AUGUSTINE, EPISTOLAE 133.2 (A.D. 411).
58 AMBROSE, EPISTOLAR 25.6, citing John 8.8f. Jesus, rather than condemning or absolv-
ing the woman, got rid of her accusers with the words: "Let him that is without sin cast
the first stone." There is an interesting parallel in SENECA, DE CLEMENTIA 1.6.2f.
59 "Inquirendi quam puniendi necessitas maior est; ad hoc enim et mitissimi homines
facinus occultatum diligenter atque instanter examinant, ut inveniant quibus parcant. Unde
plerumque necesse est, exerceatur acrius inquisitio, ut manifestato scelere, sit ubi appareat
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barbaric methods of torture, he sanctioned Marcellinus' use of the rod, remarking
that this method of coercion was customary in the home, in the school, and in
episcopal courts.6 0 In general, Augustine believed that strict judges and severe
laws were necessary, but that their purpose was to induce repentance and not to
exact vengeance. 6 1 Similarly, Ambrose considered that the death penalty should be
retained in the law "to repress the madness of crime." The judge who did not
sentence to death took the better course. But, according to Ambrose, he should
have free choice in the matter, and not be forced to show mercy "by the neces-
sity of the law." 6 2 In sum, while Augustine, Ambrose, and other church leaders
of progressive views clearly had a beneficent influence on the administration of
the law,6 3 it is evident that they did not attempt to promote a movement of
penal reform, and did not conceive of such a movement. 64
II
We may now ask in what manner and to what extent political developments
in Rome affected the penal system.
mansuetudo." AUGUSTiNE, EpiSTOLAE 133.2. Seneca's attitude to torture is similar. See
DE CLEMENTIA 2.4.3.
60 It may be doubted whether fathers and teachers administered beatings for the same
reasons as bishops in their courts.
61 E.g., AUGUSTINE, EpisTOLAE 100.1: "Unde ex occasione terribilium iudicum ac legum,
ne in aeterni iudicii poenas incidant, corrigi eos cupimus, non necari; nec disciplinam circa
eos neglegi volumus nec supplicia, quae digna sunt, exerceri."
62 AMBROSE, EPISTOLAE 25.9 (Ambrose's view is the traditional one-maluerunt priores
nostri . . .). A Christian judge who sentenced to death could be "excused." Ibid. 25.3.
83 Beneficent influence: AUGUSTINE, EPISTOLAE 115 (A.D. 410) ; cf. 268; PETER BROWN,
AUGUSTINE OF Hippo 195 (Berkeley, 1967); AMBROSE, EPISTOLAE 51 (A.D. 391); 54 (A.D.
392). But both bishops favored strict measures against heretics and non-Christians. See,
e.g., AUGUSTINE, EPISTOLA- 173 (A.D. 416); 179 (A.D. 418); 191 (A.D. 418).
For Ambrose, GESTA CONCnLn A~uILEIENSIS (MIoNE, PATROLOOI, LATINA VOL. 16,
955f.) on heretics, and EPISTOLAE 40-1 (A.D. 388) on Jews. The Christian Emperors of
the fourth century were responsible for some minor improvements. Constantine, for ex-
ample, banned gladiatorial games (CoDEx THEODOSIANUS 15.12.1, A.D. 325), crucifixion
(VICTOR, CAESARES 41), and branding on the face (CODEX THEODOSIANUS 9.40.2, A.D.
315). His motives were not so much "humanitarian" as religious (e.g., branding of the
face, but not of other parts of the body, was forbidden because of the fashioning of the
face ad similitudinem pulchritudinis caelestis). On the other side could be mentioned
Constantine's intolerance of religious nonconformity and moral deviation, which showed
itself in legislation against heresy (EuSEBIUS, VITA CONSTANTINi 3.64-5; CODEX THEO-
DOSIANUS 16.2.1, A.D. 313 [?]; 16.5.1, A.D. 326), schism (CORPUS SCRIPTORUM ECCLESIAS-
TICORUM LATINORUM 26.211-2, A.D. 315 = COLEMAN-NORTON, op. cit. supra note 47 at I,
24), Jews (CODEX THEODOSIANUS 16.8.1, A.D. 315; 2, A.D. 330), and pagans (ibid. 16.10.2,
A.D. 341), on the one hand, and abduction and rape on the other (ibid. 9.24.1
A.D. 320--Constantius reduced the penalty because judges would not inflict it, ibid. 2, A.D.
349). Subsequent Emperors in the fourth century further expanded the criminal law and
increased sanctions. For example, the number of offenses punishable by death multiplied in
the course of the fourth century. There were minor concessions, e.g., ibid. 9.38.3, A.D. 367
(pardons issued on account of Easter); 9.35.4, A.D. 380 (no torture for 40 days before
Easter) ; 9.3.7, A.D. 409 (Sunday inspection of prisons). But limitations were placed on the
right of sanctuary. See ibid. 9.45.1, A.D. 392; 3, A.D. 398. These last constitutions show
that the State could not always expect the cooperation of the Church in the administration
of the law. See also 9.40.15, A.D. 392; 16, A.D. 398.
64 The "inadequacies" (from the modem viewpoint) which are here attributed to Stoicism
and Christianity were not peculiar to those creeds - no ancient philosophy or religion
advocated large-scale social and legal change.
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It should first be recognized that the penal changes which occurred in Rome
were closely associated with wider developments in the judicial system, for which
the Emperors were responsible. Among these developments, the institution of
cognitio, the new procedure which coexisted with, and in time superseded, both
the formulary system in civil law and the jury-court system in criminal law, is of
central importance. Cognitio stood for the principle that it was the state's respon-
sibility to administer justice. Criminal law in Rome as elsewhere began as
private vengeance.65 The community encroached on private punishment only
to impose a penalty and to provide arbitration between the two parties. At
the time of the Twelve Tables, only high treason, murder, and arson were
punished by the state. We have seen that in the late Republic several other
offenses were singled out as "public," or as offenses against the state, and that
"public" jury-courts were set up by the People to try them. After Augustus no
additions were made either to the number of "public" courts or to the number
of "public" crimes. But within two hundred years there were no active jury-
courts and no "private" offenses which could not be punished by a criminal
procedure, the same procedure which had displaced the jury-courts.
The introduction of cognitio and the decline of the older procedures made
possible fluctuations in penalty on a large scale. There are two reasons for this.
First, in fixing a penalty for one of the "private" crimes, the judge was likely
to consider not only the loss suffered by an individual (often precisely cal-
culable), but in addition the damage done to society (incalculable and sus-
ceptible of differing interpretations). If these were not strictly regarded as
crimes against the state, they were at least a social nuisance or a social danger,
a threat to peace and good government. Secondly, in the case of the tribunals
which operated by the cognitio procedure, the penalty was not dictated by the
laws which set up the jury-courts and defined the crimes concerned. If we take
these two points together, we arrive at the following result: once the principle
of private compensation for injury or loss was pushed into the background by
the transformation of delicts into crimes, neither the law nor the judicial system
provided any ceiling for punishments.
The reformed criminal law of the Empire, then, had a new flexibility. It
remains to explain why, instead of remaining static or improving, the position
of defendants measurably deteriorated. One factor relates to problems of law
enforcement. The Roman state lacked an efficient police force at every level,
Imperial, provincial, and local. As the Imperial "police" forces throughout our
period were only rudimentary, the responsibility for putting down crime must
have devolved largely on the provincial governors.66 But the governors lacked
sufficient resources for effective crime detection - this, rather than innate de-
generacy or laziness (to which Imperial constitutions of the fourth century
65 See W. KUNKEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
261. (trans. J. M. Kelly, Oxford, 1966). Cf. R. SALEILLES, THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF
PUNISHMENT 21f. (trans. R. S. Jastrow, London, 1911); A. HARDING, A SOCIAL HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW ch. 1 (London, 1966).
66 For the Imperial "police" forces in the second and third centuries, see 0. HIRSCHFELD,
KLEINE SCHRIFTEN II 566f. (Berlin, 1913); the fourth-century evidence is collected in
A. H. M. JONES, I LATER ROMAN EMPIRE 479f., 499f. (Oxford, 1964).
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often refer),67 must have been the chief reason for their evident inadequacy.
Local magistrates and councils were expected to join forces with the governors
in apprehending criminals, but they lacked both the equipment and the enthu-
siasm necessary for the task. As a result much must have been left to private
persons. Criminal trials were in any case launched by private accusers, in the
absence of a system of public prosecution. In general, however, individuals were
unlikely to denounce criminals and act as prosecutors unless moved by strong
personal considerations, especially as no criminal accusation could proceed with-
out the filing of a formal inscriptio, in which the accuser both agreed not to
abandon the prosecution and made himself liable to severe penalties if he failed
to prove his case. In practice, therefore, crimes must frequently have gone
undetected and unpunished. The Emperors were nonetheless anxious to punish
and stamp out crime in the interests of order, efficiency, and security. This,
coupled with the belief that crime could be curbed most effectively by severity,
may have contributed to a scaling up of penalties.S
A more basic factor, stressed as we have seen by Montesquieu and Durkheim,
was the absolutist trend in Roman government. The Principate of Augustus was
a disguised monarchy. Augustus did not abolish the Republic, but claimed to
have restored it. As late as the Severan age, jurists were stressing that the
Emperor's powers were constitutional, that is, they were received from the
Senate and People.6 9 But, inevitably, his extraconstitutional powers had come
to the fore. Among them was the power to make law. Even advice given less
formally than by edict was obeyed as an order, so that the Severan jurist Ulpian
could write that any decision of an Emperor had the force of law.70  More-
over, the Emperor was godlike, worshipped after his death and to a certain
extent in his lifetime. This added to the mystique of the law of which he was
increasingly the source, and therefore to the outrageousness of a crime. Treason,
as was to be expected, was loosely defined and harshly punished. But other
crimes, which did not endanger the Emperor's life or directly insult his person,
might nonetheless be taken as slights to his majesty.
In the late third and the fourth century, no attempt was made to perpetuate
the myth of the constitutionality of the Emperor's position, and his powers were
more openly displayed. Diocletian and his successors, reacting against the pro-
67 For overt or implied criticism of judges, see, e.g., CoDEx THEODOsiANus 7.18.4.4,
A.D. 380; 2.1.6, A.D. 385; 1.5.9, A.D. 389 (iudices corpore marcentes et neglegentes desidiae
somniis oscitantes) .
68 Even Seneca, who regarded emendatio, correction, as a possible aim of punishment
(DE CLEMENTIA 1.22.1; Cf. GELLIUS, NOCTES ArricAE 7.14.1 ), acknowledged that severitas
was the best corrective (ibid. 2.). (See also ibid. 2.4.4 on the compatibility of cle-netia
and severitas.) He further admitted that Emperors nornally punished for retribution, or
revenge (ibid. 1.20.1-2). Some of the legal reformers of the eighteenth century argued that
moderate penalties would achieve the desired result, if combined with a certainty and
promptness of punishment. See L. RADzlNowicz, I HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW
AND Irs ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, at 277, 330 (London, 1948), for Beccaria and
Romilly.19 Gzuus, INSTITUTIONES 1.5; DIGEST 1.4.1 (Ulpian). See next note.
70 DIGEST 1.4.1: qutod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem. Ulpian went on to claim
that the power to make law was constitutionally based. But to the best of our knowledge,
the lex de imperio, the law which conferred power on the Emperor, did not grant him this
right.
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longed anarchy of the mid-third century, sought greater safety in a new exalta-
tion of themselves and their office. Diocletian introduced oriental court cere-
monial and declared himself Jupiter on earth, using the title "Iovius." The
Christian Emperors claimed only to be servants of the divinity. 7 ' But it was
sacrilege to disobey their edicts.72
III
The results of the discussion to this point may now be summarized. The
following factors begin to explain the extended use of harsher penalties under
the Roman Empire: absolutist tendencies in government and the growth of a
ruler cult; the increased activity but continued inefficiency of the central admin-
istration in the sphere of law enforcement; the removal of limitations within the
judicial system through the substitution of flexible for rigid and formalized
procedures, and the expansion of the criminal law. These were all a direct or
indirect result of the substitution of Monarchy for Republic. Thus the theory
that the severity of penalties is related to the nature of government is indeed
confirmed by the case of Rome.
It would be surprising if an explanation of the trend to harsher penalties in
Rome which mentioned only factors of a political nature and omitted all refer-
ence to social factors were adequate. Durkheim's theory of social development
is not appropriate. He argued, as we have seen, that the development of a
society from simplicity of structure and organization to complexity of structure
and organization is accompanied by a reduction in the harshness of penalties.
This does not apply in the Roman case. 73 The only enlightenment provided by
Durkheim's theory lies in the analogy which is suggested between the nature of
crime, and hence of punishment, in a community governed by an absolute ruler
and in a primitive community-in both kinds of community, crimes take on a
sacrilegious character. However, it should be possible to find a connection be-
tween variations in the severity of punishment and changes in social structures
and attitudes without subscribing to holistic theories of social evolution.
A view which became current in the nineteenth century is that an ameliora-
tion in penalties may be set in motion by the emergence of humanitarian atti-
tudes, especially towards the punishment of criminals. This view (which
Durkheim rejected outright with eccentric logic) 74 drew support from the phe-
71 See, e.g., the letters of Constantine quoted in EusEsuss, VITA CONSTANTINI 2.24-42,
A.D. 324 (certainly authentic, see COLEMAN-NORTON, Op. cit. sura note 47 at I, 106), and
ibid. 2.48-60, A.D. 324 (perhaps not authentic, COLEMAN-NORTON, ibid. 98). The ambi-
guity of a Christian Emperor's position is captured nicely by CODEX TmEODOSIANUS 15.4.1,
A.D. 425.
72 The earliest reference comes from the reign of Constantine. See CODEx THEODost-
ANUS 11.30.6, A.D. 316. Cf. 9.42.6, A.D. 364; 1.6.9, 6.5.2, A.D. 384; 8.8.3, 6.35.13,
A.D. 386; 10.10.24, AD. 405. Sacrilege and treason are virtually identical. See 9.42.6, AD.
364; 9.38.3, A.D. 367.
73 Durkheim's theory indeed seems to be applicable only to primitive societies on the one
hand, and modem capitalist societies on the other.
74 DURKHEIM, op. cit. suppra note 6 at 85-6. According to the conventional argument
which Durkheim was attacking, "'adoucissement des moeurs" would produce a horror of
punishments, with the consequence that the scale of punishments would be reduced. Durk-
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nomenon of a movement for legal reform which brought about a reduction in
penalties even in states where the form of government was by no means demo-
cratic. 7 5 It is worth inquiring whether the increase in the intensity of penalties
in Rome was related to a change in Roman social values.
The almost general amelioration in penalties in the period of legal reform
of modern times was forced on governments by the demands of a wide section of
the community. In Rome there was no comparable pressure for penal reform
from the most influential section of the population, the highest status groups.
Within the governing class there were doubtless men of progressive views, of
whom the Stoic Seneca is one example, who were concerned that principles of
humanity should be applied, not only in the private dealings of men with their
fellows, but also in the administration of the law. Seneca, however, did not in
his writing commit himself to a positive program of reform (he seldom progressed
beyond enlightened generalizations), nor, to my knowledge, did any improve-
ments come about through his influence. Meanwhile the interests of the aristoc-
racy as a whole were in the maintenance of their privileges. It was this same
small privileged group which, possessed of considerable discretionary powers as
judges and administrators, presided over the steady deterioration of the condi-
tion of the ordinary free man and low-ranking citizen. (The situation of their
own group did not materially change for the worse until the fourth century.)
There is a case for saying that new degrading penalties could not have been
introduced into general use, and the level of penalties could not have continued
to rise, if the ruling elite had not been progressively more indifferent to the
lot of the mass of the population of the Empire. To argue in this way is not to
fall back on the old theme of moral decadence and the fall of Empire. An alter-
native approach, which draws on more concrete phenomena, recognizes that
Roman social values were a product of a highly stratified society.
It was an insight of de Tocqueville that social values and attitudes are
intimately related to patterns of social stratification. In his writings this idea
appears in conjunction with the thesis that changing social values have an im-
pact on the law. He argued that education, the influence of religion, "civiliza-
tion," do not in themselves bring about a humane attitude to punishment. A
general equality of social conditions is an essential factor. To paraphrase de
Tocqueville, as the individuals in a society become more like one another, they
show greater sympathy for those among them who suffer, and as a result the
law of the society becomes milder.76 The leniency characteristic of the Amer-
heim held that if we feel this horror of harsh penalties, we would simultaneously feel a
greater horror or anger at the crimes for which these penalties are awarded. The result
would thus be a raising of penalties.
75 On the movement for penal reform, see, e.g., M. GRONHUT, PENAL REFORM (Oxford,
1948); G. RosE, THE STRUOGLE FOR PENAL REFORM (London, 1961).
76 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DE LA DkMOcRATIE EN AMiRIQUE pt. 3, ch. 1 (1840), is
entitled "Comment les moeurs s'adoucissent A mesure que les conditions s'6galisent." The
section ends with the comment: "A mesure ... que les peuples deviennent plus semblables
les uns aux autres, ils se montrent r~ciproquemeni plus compatissants pour leurs misires, et le
droit des gens s'adoucit." The reference here is to relations between nations, and to inter-
national law, but the remark is equally applicable to relations between individuals, and
to the law of a community - the subject of most of the chapter.
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ican criminal law in his day was for him a consequence of the "equality of con-
ditions," the homogeneity of American society; while the class divisions of
contemporary English society were in his view reflected in the greater severity
of its penal system. We might claim, adapting his thesis, that the tendency
towards harsher penalties in Imperial Rome was encouraged by the increasingly
stratified nature of Roman society.
De Tocqueville illustrated his theory with a brief reference to the Roman
penal system, without, however, attempting to explain the changes it underwent
in the course of the transition from Republic to Empire or during the Empire.
Moreover, he did not look beyond the distinction between Roman citizens and
free aliens. This was a fundamental distinction in the civil law, but not the most
significant in social terms. It was not so much possession, of citizenship as
possession of social status which provided prestige, political influence, and the
full benefits of the law. Citizenship was most valuable when it was the exclusive
possession of men of high rank, but this stage had been passed by the beginning
of our period, and citizenship declined further in importance under the Empire.
In early Imperial times, gradations in rank were given a more formal basis; and
the division between honestiores and humiliores, those of (relatively) high rank
and those of (relatively) low rank, was accentuated. 77 In the fourth century
the Imperial government attempted to reduce social mobility and to impose
something approaching a hereditary caste system.78 Differences within the higher
orders became more marked, and, at the same time, administrative corruption
and economic oppression widened the gap between the upper and lower strata
in the society as a whole. Thus it can be argued with some plausibility that the
spirit of the criminal law became less humane, and the atmosphere increasingly
unfavorable to penal reform, as social divisions became more rigid and as wealth
was concentrated in fewer hands.
In the preceding pages an attempt has been made to isolate some of the
factors which explain the mounting severity of the Roman penal system under
the Empire. The chief impetus was provided by political developments; in par-
ticular, the change in the nature of political authority in Rome, and the
increased activity of the state in the judicial sphere. The conservatism of Roman
social values (that is, the values of the Roman upper classes), and the hierar-
chical structure of Roman society, helped to create a climate favorable to
increased repression and unfavorable to penal reform.
The inquiry has been in no sense exhaustive.7 9 There is scope for a further
77 See G. Cardascia, L'Apparition dans le Droit Des Classes D' "Honestiores" et D'
"Humiliores," 27 REVUE HISTORIQUE DE DROIT FRANgAIS ET ETRANGER 305-37, 461-85
(1950), on the honestiores-humiliores distinction.
78 The attempts of the Emperors to stop decurions and their sons escaping from their
responsibilities for' local liturgies by taking up other careers is particularly well documented.
See CoDEx THEODOSIANUS 12.1 passim. For fugitive coloni, see, e.g., ibid. 5.17.1, A.D. 332
(Constantine); 11.24.1, A.D. 360; 11.1.7, AD. 361; 10.12.2, A.D. 368; 5.17.2, A.D. 386, etc.
7s In particular, more consideration could have been given to causes of an economic
nature which may lie behind changes in the penal system. One illustration will suffice, one
which shows, incidentally, the way in which social, economic, and political forces may work
together to produce changes in patterns of punishment. It could be suggested that the
penalty of condemnation to the mines was promoted in the early Empire partly in order to
provide labor for the imperial mines. The maintenance of an adequate work force must
NATURAL LAW FORUM
study, taking particular penalties, or particular segments of the penal law (for
example, the punishment of property offenses or religious offenses), with the
aim of explaining their development over a period of time. This essay has been
more general in purpose and exploratory in nature. It has achieved its aim if it
has demonstrated the potential value of investigations into the causes of historical
variations in crime and punishment.8 0
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have become more difficult under the Empire, as the supply of slaves fell off and their
price rose. The employment of convicts on the building and repair of roads and aqueducts
and on other services such as bread-making (opus publicum) was also an economic neces-
sity. Nevertheless, when we consider the introduction of forced labor as a penalty under the
Empire, we cannot avoid referring to political and social factors. Condemnation to the
mines became a possible penalty when the state, in the person of the Emperor, began
to take over mines in Italy and the provinces from private hands. Again, the penalty would
not have gained the status of a regular secondary penalty without the tacit consent or
active support of judges and administrators. (In eighteenth-century England, proposals
for the introduction of an equivalent of the Roman opus publicum, forced labor on public
works, and especially in His Majesty's dockyards, were consistently blocked in Parliament
on constitutional grounds and "as incompatible with the dignity of the English people."
See L. RAoDzNOWxCZ, op. cit. supra note 68 at 33.)
80 I am grateful to Professor P. Selznick for helpful suggestions.
